ABSTRACT Inter-block shuffle has been proved to be able to enhance the security for JPEG image encryption. However, it does not change the numbers of non-zero coefficients in 8 * 8 blocks. This leads to information leakage. In this paper, the defects of inter-block shuffle are analyzed. An attack scheme is developed based on a combined application of chosen-plain-text attack and non-zero quantized coefficients counting attack. It is verified that the main content of the original image could be reconstructed without the knowledge of encryption algorithm details and keys. The attack results are visualized to be mosaic appearance images. An improvement of the attack is also provided, which is called a fast mosaic attack. In the improved attack, the chosen images are designed to have distinguished numbers of non-zero quantized DCT coefficients in different blocks. The designed images remarkably accelerate the attack processing. The fast mosaic attack generates the same results as the original scheme with the much smaller time cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most of digital images nowadays are compressed and stored by Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG) image compression standard due to the high compression ratio and good reconstruction quality [1] . The accelerating growth of network technology makes it easy to spread, share and change these JPEG images via open networks. However, some images need to keep the privacy content confidential between authorized users. Image encryption is a solution for this problem. It encrypts images content, hide visual information and protect confidential data. JPEG image encryption tries to keep the compression ratio during the processing, which requires considering the special properties of JPEG images [2] .
There are mainly two types of commonly used digital image encryption algorithms: spatial domain encryption and transform domain encryption. Spatial encryption destroys the local correlation and spatial orderliness of
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jiafeng Xie. pixels [3] . This processing transforms plain-text images into cipher-text images with noise-like or texture-like appearance [4] . These cipher-text images are difficult to compress and the compression ratio will be enlarged compared with the plain-text. Transform domain based image encryption algorithms diffuse and confuse transform domain coefficients [5] . JPEG image encryption should be performed in discrete cosine transformation (DCT) domain [6] . The reason is that the high compression ratio of JPEG image comes from DCT, quantization and entropy coding. DCT domain encryption could keep the compression ratio in an acceptable range.
This paper analyzes the principle of DCT domain based JPEG image encryption schemes. An algorithm is proposed that combines chosen-plain-text attack and numbers of non-zero quantize DCT coefficients attack. The attack methods and its improvement are elaborated. The simulation experiments show the proposed attacks are not resistant for inter-block shuffle based encryption algorithms. The main content of the plain-text image can be reconstructed without knowing encryption details and keys.
II. DCT-BASED JPEG IMAGE ENCRYPTION ALGORITHMS
The processing steps of JPEG compression include image segmentation, color space conversion, discrete cosine transformation, quantization, Zigzag scan, zero run length encoding and entropy coding. Quantization process makes many of the higher frequency components be rounded to zero. This is beneficial for lossy compression. Zero run length encoding and entropy coding provide lossless compression [7] .
JPEG image encryption algorithm should keep the compression ratio after encryption. This principle guides the operations of JPEG encryption [2] .
The compression process of JPEG is usually based on image sub-blocks of 8 * 8 pixels. After DCT, there are 64 coefficients. The upper left corner element of the coefficients array is called DC coefficient, and the other 63 elements are called AC coefficients. DC coefficient contains the main information such as the brightness of the image, and AC coefficients contain texture information [7] . Inverse DCT (IDCT) cannot reconstruct the original 8 * 8 block when the quantized DCT coefficients are encrypted. In order to maintain the compression rate, traditional DCT-based encryption methods keep the number of non-zero quantized coefficients in the entire image. The major encryption processing includes intrablock scrambling and shuffle.
A. INTRA-BLOCK SCRAMBLING
Intra-block scrambling performs in the unit of 8 * 8 blocks. The quantized DCT coefficients are scrambled to be different numbers.
1) SCRAMBLE QUANTIZED DC COEFFICIENTS
In quantized DCT coefficients array, most of the information is carried by the DC coefficient. It usually has the biggest value of the entire 64 quantized DCT coefficients in the unit. An algorithm has been proposed which encrypts DC coefficient. The AC coefficients are not processed [8] . The scrambling of main energy makes the image cannot display properly. Therefore, the cipher-text image is unrecognizable.
2) SCRAMBLE QUANTIZED DC AND NON-ZERO AC COEFFICIENTS
Quantized DC coefficients scrambling changes block energy distribution. Quantized AC coefficients scrambling ruins image texture and makes the image incomprehensible [9] . To keep the zero run length and maintain the compression rate, zero coefficients usually are not scrambled.
B. INTRA BLOCK SHUFFLE
Intra block shuffle takes place in 8 * 8 sub-blocks. The quantized DCT coefficients positions are shuffled.
1) NON-ZERO QUANTIZED AC COEFFICIENTS SHUFFLE
This kind of process shuffles the non-zero quantized AC coefficients in the 8 * 8 block. Thus, the zero run lengths are kept to remain the compression ratio as much as possible.
2) ALL QUANTIZED AC COEFFICIENTS SHUFFLE
All of the quantized AC coefficients are shuffled, no matter the value is zero or not [10] . The shuffle operation changes zero run length. Thus, the compression rate is affected.
There are also other quantized DCT coefficients scramble and shuffle methods. For example, the run of zeros along with the non-zero coefficient that terminate the run are combined to be a symbol. The symbol is encrypted by random sequence [11] . The processing scrambles the value of the non-zero coefficient and changes its position at the same time.
C. DEFECT ANALYSIS
During all of these before mentioned DCT-based encryption processing, the numbers of non-zero valued quantized DCT coefficients are generally not changed. This leads to information leakage. Even some of these methods are combined to improve security, the information leakage still exists. A notable phenomenon is that 8 * 8 blocks with different textures have different numbers of non-zero quantized DCT coefficients. Those blocks containing edges usually have more non-zero quantized coefficients than others. This means the number of non-zero quantized DCT coefficients is related to texture and edge information of the corresponding 8 * 8 block.
Based on these defects, an attack scheme named as nonzero-counting attack (NZCA) is designed [12] . It obtains image sketches from encrypted JPEG images without any idea of encryption algorithms. The algorithm counts the number of non-zero quantized coefficients in each 8 * 8 block of the cipher-text image, and sets certain thresholds to obtain the sketch of the plain-text image. The attack example is provided in Fig.1 . 
III. INTER-BLOCK SHUFFLING A. IMPROVEMENTS OF ENCRYPTION
In order to ensure the security of the JPEG image encryption, an effective encryption method should provide a good resis-VOLUME 7, 2019 tant to NZCA. Considering the precondition of NZCA is that the number of non-zero coefficients in each block does not change, there are two approaches of improvements.
1) ZERO COEFFICIENTS ENCRYPTED TO BE NON-ZERO COEFFICIENTS
The algorithm changes the zero coefficients to non-zero coefficients. This algorithm can hide the texture and edge information contained in blocks. However, changing the nonzero coefficient of the block greatly reduce the compression ratio of the image [13] .
2) INTER-BLOCK SHUFFLING
This algorithm is similar to puzzle, which shuffles block units [12] . This method changes the position of edges and textures without changing the numbers of non-zero coefficients in blocks. In this case, the NZCA cannot restore the sketch of the image. This method does not change the number of nonzero coefficients for the whole quantized DCT array. However, it changes the difference of quantized DC coefficients between neighbor blocks, which keeps the compression ratio change in an acceptable range. Fig.1(a) . The NZCA result is showed in Fig.2 
(b).
It is observed that the attack does not get information about the original plain-text image.
B. VULNERABILITY OF INTER-BLOCK SHUFFLE
Inter block shuffle usually is combined with non zero quantized coefficients scrambling or shuffle algorithms [9] . It seems that all the possible information is covered up and the security of encrypted image is ensured. Unfortunately, if the position mapping relationships between the original and encrypted blocks are found, the positions of all the blocks can be restored and the original image information will be leaked. The vulnerability of inter block shuffle is that the algorithm does not change the number of non-zero coefficients in the each block during the encryption process. Although the NZCA can be avoided, it still contains plain-text's information. The shuffle mapping relationship of block position could be obtained by chosen-plain-text attack.
IV. NOVEL ATTACK FOR INTER-BLOCK SHUFFLE BASED ALGORITHMS

A. PRINCIPLE OF THE ATTACK
Chosen-plain-text attack is a process of deciphering an encryption method under the condition of known pairs of plain-text and cipher-text. It is the most threatening type for cryptosystem. A secure encryption system must be able to withstand the chosen-plain-text attack [14] .
The inter-block shuffle does not change the number of non-zero coefficients in each block. Chosen-plain-text attack could find out the block shuffle mapping relationship by changing the number of non-zero quantized DCT coefficients in each block individually. Once the mapping relationships of block positions are revealed, the original block positions could be reconstructed. Then, NZCA is applied to obtain the sketch of the original image. The attack steps are as following:
(1) There is the goal cipher-text JPEG image G and its corresponding quantized DCT coefficients array dctG. The encryption algorithm is based on inter-block shuffle and other schemes. These schemes do not change the number of non-zero quantized DCT coefficients in 8 * 8 blocks. The encryption algorithm is kind of like a black box. The details and keys are invisible. However, any plain-text JPEG image can be imputed to the black box and get the corresponding cipher-text at the output terminal. Chose an assistant JPEG image P, which has the same size as the goal cipher-text image G. The assistant image P is encrypted by the encryption black box to get the corresponding cipher-text image C. And their quantized DCT coefficients arrays are dctP and dctC, respectively. The detail of the encryption and key are kept unknown. However, with the help of assistant image, the goal cipher-text JPEG image is cracked.
B. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, the combination of chosen-plain-text attack and NZCA described in previous section is implemented. The known conditions are as following:
(1) Black box of JPEG encryption algorithm. The algorithm is known as based on inter-block shuffle scheme with details and keys invisible. The keys of the encryption black box are kept on the same value. For any plain-text image entering the input terminal, the corresponding cipher-text image in the output terminal can be obtained. The original plain-text image is Fig.1(a) . Fig.2(a) is the encryption result of Fig.1(a) with inter-block shuffle based algorithm. Compare Fig.3 and Fig.2(b) . It is obvious that NZCA algorithm does not get the corresponding sketch of plain-text image. However, the sketch is obtained after the combined attack of chosen-plain-text attack and NZCA algorithm. It indicates that the inter-block shuffle can defend against NZCA algorithm attack, while cannot withstand the novel attack.
C. MOSAIC IMAGE OF NON-ZERO COUNTING
Non-zero-counting attack (NZCA) counts the number of nonzero quantized coefficients in each 8 * 8 block and sets certain thresholds to obtain the sketch of the plain-text image. The result image is black and white like Fig.1(c), Fig.2(b) and Fig.3 . These images are called sketches of the original plaintext images because they only keep the brief edge information. Numbers of non-zero quantized DCT coefficients contains texture and edge information. The binarization abandons the texture information.
In this paper, the numbers of non-zero quantized coefficients in each 8 * 8 block are visualized to adapt human visual perception. This processing keeps the texture information and avoids binarization thresholds setting. The visualization values pixels by the following equation:
R (x, y) = nBlock (x, y) * 255/max (x,y) (nBlock(x, y)) (1) in which R(x,y) is the value of 64 pixels in the 8 * 8 block at position (x,y), nBlock(x,y) is the number of non-zero quantized DCT coefficients in the 8 * 8 block at position (x,y) max (x,y) , (nBlock(x, y)) is the maximum value of all nBlock(x,y).
Since all pixels in a block are set as the same value, the result image of visualization processing is mosaic appearance. Fig.4 presented mosaic appearance result images using the novel method. The attack result keeps more details for bigger sized image. If the size of goal cipher-text image is smaller than 128 * 128, the proposed attack may not be able to get the main content of the plain-text image.
V. FAST MOSAIC ATTACK WITH APPROPRIATELY DESIGNED ASSISTANT IMAGE A. PRINCIPLE OF THE FAST ATTACK
The proposed attack algorithm could find out the main content of goal cipher-text image without knowledge of encryption details and keys. The aforementioned attack requires three processes: 1.Change the number of non-zero quantized DCT coefficients in each block to get dctP ij and novel constructed assistant image P ij . 2. Encrypt P ij . 3. Compare the difference of assistant cipher-text quantized DCT coefficients arrays dctC ij and dctC, find out the (i,j)-th position shuffle mapping result. If the size of goal cipher-text image is M * N, there will be ceil (M /8) * ceil(N /8) times coefficients changing, IDCT, encryption, DCT and comparison operations. In which ceil(z) is the rounded up integer. These operations are time demanding. Moreover, there are many blocks due to the bulk size of image data. These factors make the processing of the proposed attack cost a long time.
It is the number of non-zero quantized DCT coefficients in blocks effect the attack result. The encryption black box scrambles these non-zero coefficients and shuffles all the 8 * 8 blocks. The scramble processing does not change the numbers of non-zero coefficients in blocks. Thus, the assistant image could be designed to have distinguished numbers of non-zero quantized DCT coefficients in different blocks. The relationship between number of non-zero quantized DCT coefficients and block coordination is one-to-one function. The special designed assistant image is imputed into the encryption black box. The corresponding cipher-text image will be at the output terminal. The mapping relationship could be revealed by counting the number of non-zero coefficients in each shuffled block of the cipher-text image. The number is viewed as a bridge between original and cipher-text block positions.
Since the block size is 8 * 8 in JPEG image, there will be 65 different numbers of non-zero coefficients in the 8 * 8 quantized DCT coefficients array of designed image, i.e. integer number in range [0, 64] . Therefore, if the goal ciphertext image size M * N meet the requirement of ceil (M /8) * ceil(N /8) ≤ 65, there will be only one designed assistant image. Moreover, it needs to be encrypted once to get the whole block position shuffle mapping relationships. If the size of cipher-text image is bigger, there will be
There are all zero coefficients blocks in the bigger sized quantized DCT array. Thus, the numbers of non-zero quantized DCT coefficients in designed blocks are integer number in the range of [1, 64] . These assistant images need to be encrypted sequentially in order to find out the block shuffle position mapping relationships. Fig.5 shows the quantized DCT coefficients array of designed images with different sizes. Fig.5(a) is quantized DCT coefficient array of designed image with size of 64 * 64. Fig.5(b) presented the sequence of four designed assistant images with size of 128 * 128. In Fig.5(a) , the array has been divided into 8 * 8 blocks. The numbers of non-zero quantized DCT coefficients in these blocks vary from 1 to 64. The relationship between number of non-zero quantized DCT coefficients and block coordination is one-to-one function. These blocks are part of quantized DCT coefficients array of designed assistant images with bigger size. In Fig.5(b) , these asistant images consist of the designed 8 * 8 blocks and 0 blocks in different coordinates.
The steps of improved attack processing with designed assistant image are as following:
(1) There is the goal cipher-text JPEG image G. The corresponding quantized DCT coefficients array is dctG. The black box of encryption algorithm is available. Design the assistant JPEG images D kl with the same size as G, and its quantized DCT coefficients array is dctD kl . These dctD kl consist of the designed blocks B, which is shown in Fig.5(a) and zero blocks. The numbers of non-zero quantized DCT coefficients in the 8 * 8 block at position (x,y) of designed blocks are
in which 1 ≤ x, y ≤ 8. This is a one-to-one function.
To simplify the processing, the (s,t)-th element of (x,y)-th block is set to be Then D kl is encrypted by the encryption black box to get the corresponding cipher-text image E kl . The quantized DCT array of E kl is dctE kl . (3) Count the numbers of non-zero quantized DCT coefficients in the (u,v)-thblock of dctE kl, which is marked as ndctE kl (u,v) . Its original position before shuffling could be calculated by
in which mod(w,z) is the modulo calculation of number w to z. The mapping relationship can be obtained. 
B. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, the attack algorithm described in section IV.A and V.A are performed to the same goal cipher-text images to verify the later accelerates the attack processing. The goal images size varies from 64 * 64 to 1024 * 1024. The computer used for this simulation is with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-6200U CPU@2.30G Hz. The time cost is presented in Table 1 . The reason is that assistant image construction and block positions mapping relationships calculation need more time. However, if the image size is bigger, encryption and domain transformation processing occupy the majority part of time cost. Thus, the ratio is asymptotic to 64 as the image size increases. Table 1 also shows that the original novel attack requires too many seconds if image size is bigger than 512 * 512. Thus, for goal images with bigger size, the improved attack is employed to obtain the attack results. Fig.6 shows the fast mosaic appearance attack results of big sized images (512 * 512, 1024 * 1024, 720 * 576, and 1024 * 1024). Images in the first column are the original plain-text images. The second column images are cipher-text images. The third are the attack results of the second column.
For sensitive and tolerant human visual system, the attack results are distinguishable. Compared with the plain-text images, the cipher-text images are noise-like. However, the main content of the original images could be obtained from the cipher-text images by the fast attack with acceptable time cost.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents the loopholes of JPEG image encryption algorithms. The combination of chosen-plain-text attack and non-zero coefficients counting attack could be employed to get the leakage of the original image content. The combined attack only needs the cipher-text image, an assistant image and the encryption black box. The mosaic visualization processing makes the main content of the original image visible.
Fast mosaic attack is provided. The appropriately designed assistant images help to accelerate the attack processing. The encryption of each assistant image produces 64 position mapping pairs. Thus, it needs less encryption processing. The fast mosaic attack results are the same as the novel attack, while time cost is much smaller. 
